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Abstract
In this paper we present a new semantics, called Local Models Semantics, and use it to provide
a foundation to reasoning with contexts. This semantics captures and makes precise the two main
intuitions underlying contextual reasoning: (i) reasoning is mainly local and uses only part of what
is potentially available (e.g., what is known, the available inference procedures), this part is what
we call context (of reasoning); however (ii) there is compatibility among the reasoning performed
in different contexts. We validate our semantics by formalizing two important forms of contextual
reasoning: reasoning with viewpoints and reasoning about belief.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The notion of context is studied in many research areas, and it has been many years now.
We only need to mention here that the notion of context is very important for disciplines
such as philosophy of language [2], cognitive science [12,15,26], pragmatics [30],
linguistics [15], and so on. In Artificial Intelligence, contexts were first introduced in
Weyhrauch’s work on mechanizing logical theories in the FOL system [43]. However
contexts became a widely discussed issue in the late 1980s, when they were independently
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proposed by Fausto Giunchiglia [25] and John McCarthy [35] as an important means
for formalizing (certain forms of) reasoning. According to [25], contexts are a tool for
formalizing the locality of reasoning, while in [35] contexts are introduced as a means of
solving the problem of generality. Coherently with these two proposals, contexts have been
used in various applications. Farquhar et al. [14], Ghidini and Serafini [22], Mylopoulos
and Motschnig-Pitrik [37] and Theodorakis et al. [42] describe the use of contexts in
dealing with issues concerning the integration of heterogeneous knowledge and data bases.
In [27] contexts are used for formalizing meta reasoning and propositional attitudes.
In [1] contexts are used in the formalization of reasoning with viewpoints. Bouquet
and Giunchiglia [5] formalize context-based common-sense reasoning. In [3,16,19,24,
28] contexts are used to formalize theoretical issues concerning reasoning about beliefs,
whereas in [4,9] contexts are used to model different aspects of agents and multi-agent
systems. Ghidini and Serafini [21], Noriega and Sierra [38] and Parsons et al. [39] describe
the use of contexts for the modeling of dialog, argumentation, and information integration
in electronic commerce. Finally, the largest common-sense knowledge-base, CYC [33],
implements and exploits an explicit notion of context [31].
Despite the plethora of different approaches, formalizations, and applications, two are
the main intuitions underlying the use of context. We state these two intuitions as the
following two principles:
Principle 1 (of Locality). Reasoning uses only part of what is potentially available (e.g.,
what is known, the available inference procedures). The part being used while reasoning is
what we call context (of reasoning);
Principle 2 (of Compatibility). There is compatibility among the kinds of reasoning
performed in different contexts.
The goal of this paper is to describe and motivate a new semantics, called Local Models
Semantics, which formalizes the two principles listed above, and that we propose as a
foundation for contextual reasoning. The core definitions are given in Section 3. To make
the presentation clearer, but also to show the generality of the approach, we informally
describe, and then formalize, using Local Models Semantics, two important examples of
contextual reasoning, namely reasoning with viewpoints, and reasoning about belief. This
material is covered in Sections 2 (informal presentation) and 4 (formalization using Local
Models Semantics).
In previous papers, various proof-theoretic formalizations of contextual reasoning have
been proposed (see [1,6,7,25,31,36]). One such axiomatization are Multi-Context Systems
(also described as Multi-Language Systems, when there was a bigger interest in analyzing
the structure of languages) [23,25,27]. To make the paper more self-contained, but also
“to close the loop”, in the second part of this paper, we analyze the relation existing
between Local Models Semantics and Multi-Context Systems (MC systems from now
on). In particular, in Section 5 we briefly overview the basic notion of MC systems and
show how MC systems capture, at the proof-theoretic level, the notions of locality and
compatibility. In Section 6 we give a formalization, in terms of MC systems, of reasoning
with viewpoints and of reasoning about belief. The technical results are given in the
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appendices, which contain the proofs of correctness and completeness results between
the MC systems defined in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 and the classes of models defined in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. We conclude with a short comparison with other
frameworks for the formalization of reasoning with contexts.
2. Two examples
The examples introduced in this section are used throughout the paper to discuss and
illustrate the ideas and the formalization of contextual reasoning we propose.
2.1. Reasoning with viewpoints
Consider the scenario of Fig. 1. There are two observers, Mr.1 and Mr.2, each having a
partial viewpoint of a box. The box consists of six sectors, each sector possibly containing
a ball. There cannot be balls hidden from the view of an observer. The box is “magic” and
observers cannot distinguish the depth inside it. Fig. 2 shows what Mr.1 and Mr.2 can see
in the scenario depicted in Fig. 1.
In this example we have two contexts, each context describing what an observer sees
(its viewpoint) and the consequences that it is able to draw from it. The content of the two
contexts is graphically represented in Fig. 2.
Locality. Both Mr.1 and Mr.2 have the notions of a ball being on the right or on the left.
However these two notions are different and we may have a ball which is on the right for
Mr.1 and not on the right for Mr.2. Furthermore Mr.2 has the notion of “a ball being in the
center of the box” which is meaningless for Mr.1.
Compatibility. The contents of Mr.1 and Mr.2’s contexts are obviously related. The
relation is a consequence of the fact that Mr.1 and Mr.2 see the same box. Fig. 3 shows
all the possible contexts for Mr.1 and Mr.2, and gives all their possible compatible
combinations. Notice that we can describe this situation by listing all the possible
Fig. 1. The magic box.
Fig. 2. Mr.1 and Mr.2’s contexts.
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Fig. 3. Compatible contexts of Mr.1 and Mr.2.
Fig. 4. Indistinguishable situations.
compatible pairs (as they are represented in Fig. 3), or we can describe it more synthetically
using descriptions like: “if Mr.1 sees at least one ball then Mr.2 sees at least one
ball”.
Notice that the most straightforward formalization of this example would be a direct
axiomatization of the box as a two-dimensional grid. Mr.1 and Mr.2’s views and contexts
could then easily be constructed by projecting the grid in two one-dimensional views.
Locality and compatibility would be guaranteed by construction. However this approach is
based on the hypothesis that we have a complete description of the world (the box in this
case), and that we can use it to build views of the world itself. This is not always the case.
Quite often there are only partial views and only a partial or approximate view of the world
can be reconstructed. This is, in fact, also the case for the magic box scenario depicted
in Fig. 1. Consider, for instance, the situations depicted in Fig. 4. These two different
situations cannot be distinguished by the two observers. The unique pair of compatible
contexts associated to the two different situations in Fig. 4 is the one marked with “*” in
Fig. 3. To obtain a complete description of the magic box, one also needs a third view from
the top (as a matter of fact, the top view by itself provides a complete description of the
balls contained into the magic box, as long as the box is only one cube deep).
An important application domain where we may or may not have a complete description
of the world is the development and integration of data or knowledge bases. In a relational,
possibly distributed, data base there is (assumed to be) a complete description of the world,
and views are built by filtering out, and appropriately merging together, part of the available
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Fig. 5. The context structure of beliefs in a scenario with a single agent.
information. On the other hand, a federation of heterogeneous data or knowledge bases,
possibly developed independently, can be seen as a set of views of an ideal data base
which is often impossible or very complex to reconstruct completely. The work in [20,22]
starts from this observation, further develops the semantics defined in this paper, and gives
foundations to the various forms of federations described in, e.g., [14,37].
2.2. Reasoning about belief
Let us consider the situation of a single agent a (usually thought of as the computer itself
or as an external observer) who is acting in a world, who has beliefs about this world and
also beliefs about its own beliefs, and it is able to reason about them. We formalize beliefs
about beliefs by exploiting the notion of belief context. The intuition is that a belief context
formalizes the “mental image” that a has of itself, or the “mental image” that it has of the
“mental image” of itself, or . . . . One more nesting of the belief operator corresponds to one
more nesting in the structure of “mental images” (contexts).
Belief contexts are organized in a chain (see Fig. 5). We call a the root context; this
context represents the beliefs of a. The context aa formalizes the beliefs that a ascribes
to itself. Iterating the nesting, the context aaa formalizes the beliefs of a about the beliefs
about its own beliefs, and so on. Let us consider only a and aa in Fig. 5, that is, the situation
with an agent a having beliefs about its own beliefs.
Locality. The belief contexts tagged with a and aa are described using different
languages. For instance a has a notion of “believing something” which aa doesn’t have.
The interpretation of a formula depends on the context we consider. For instance the
sentence “it is raining” in the context a expresses the fact that, in the representation of the
world made by the agent a, it is raining. The same sentence “it is raining” in the context
aa expresses the fact that the agent a ascribes to itself the belief that it is raining. Notice
also that, in general, a and aa may contain different beliefs about the world.
Compatibility. The contents of different contexts are obviously related. These relations,
which in principle can be very different, express how a’s beliefs and the beliefs that a
ascribes to itself are connected. An obvious relation is the following: if a sentence of
the form φ is in aa, then a sentence of the form “I believe that φ” is in a. In this case
we say that a is a correct observer (with respect to the sentence “I believe that φ”).
Another situation is when a sentence of the form φ is in aa, only if a sentence of the form
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Fig. 6. The context structure of beliefs in a scenario with two agents.
“I believe that φ” is in a. In this case we say that a is a complete observer (with respect to
the sentence “I believe that φ”). A taxonomy of the possible relations involving belief about
belief is introduced in [28] and then refined in [24]. In these papers the authors show that,
depending on the relations among different contexts, the agent a has different reasoning
capabilities.
These observations about locality and compatibility can be easily generalized to consider
a chain of any depth or to consider a multi-agent scenario, where each agent comes with
its, usually different, language, knowledge base, and reasoning capabilities. Fig. 6 shows
the structure of contexts in a multi-agent scenario where an external observer ε ascribes a
collection of beliefs to two agents a and b. 1 The contexts tagged with a, and b, represent
the beliefs that ε ascribes to a and b, respectively; the contexts tagged with aa, and ab,
represent the mental images that a has of its own beliefs and of the beliefs of b, respectively
(from the point of view of ε), and so on. For a more detailed description of this structure,
a good reference is [9], where belief contexts are used to solve a well-known puzzle
involving reasoning about belief and ignorance, namely the Three-Wise-Men problem.
An important application of the ideas and intuitions briefly illustrated in this section is
the specification and development of complex agents platforms. The approach described
above, first proposed in [24], is now current practice in much of the work in agent
technology (see, e.g., [4,16,38,39,41]).
3. Local Models Semantics
We define in turn the notions of local model and model, context, local satisfiability and
satisfiability, and logical consequence.
3.1. Local models and models
Let {Li}i∈I be a family of languages defined over a set of indexes I (in the following we
drop the index i ∈ I ). Intuitively, each Li is the (formal) language used to describe what
is true in a context. For the purpose of our work we suppose that I is (at most) countable.
Let us restrict ourselves to (classes of) first order languages. Let Mi be the class of all the
models (interpretations) of Li . We call m ∈Mi a local model (of Li ).
1 Taking a realistic attitude one might safely assume that ε describes what is actually true in the real world.
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A compatibility sequence c (for {Li}) is a sequence
c= 〈c0, c1, . . . , ci , . . .〉,
where, for each i ∈ I , ci is a subset of Mi . We call ci the ith element of c. If I = {1,2},
we call c a (compatibility) pair.
A compatibility relation C (for {Li}) is a set C = {c} of compatibility sequences c.
Formally, let
∏
i∈I 2Mi be the Cartesian product of the collection {2Mi : i ∈ I }. 2 The
compatibility relation C is a relation of type
C ⊆
∏
i∈I
2Mi .
A model is a compatibility relation which contains at least a sequence and does not
contain the sequence of empty sets.
Definition 3.1 (Model). A model (for {Li}) is a compatibility relation C such that:
(1) C 
= ∅;
(2) 〈∅,∅, . . . ,∅, . . .〉 /∈ C.
Conditions (1) and (2) eliminate meaningless compatibility relations and sequences,
namely totally inconsistent context structures. In the following we write C to mean either
a compatibility relation or a model, the context always makes clear what we mean. Fig. 7
gives a graphical representation of the construction we perform with I = {1,2,3}. We
start from L1,L2, and L3. Then, we associate each Li with a set Mi ⊆ Mi of local
models. Usually Mi ⊂Mi . Finally, we pair local models inside compatibility pairs and then
compatibility sequences. The resulting compatibility relation is our model. Local models
describe what is locally true. Compatibility sequences put together local models which are
“mutually compatible”, consistently with the situation we are describing (see Example 3.1
below). Compatibility relations and models are sets of “mutually compatible” sequences
of local models.
Example 3.1. The construction described in Fig. 7 can be used to “build” the situation
described in Fig. 3. First, we define the two languages L1 and L2 describing the views
of Mr.1 and Mr.2, respectively. Both L1 and L2 are two propositional languages, L1
describing that a ball can be on the left or on the right, and L2 describing that a ball can
be on the left, in the center, or on the right. Second, we construct all the possible situations
(models) for L1 and L2. This leads to the definition of the four situations (models) for L1
depicted on the lefthand side in Fig. 3, and of the eight possible situations (models) for L2
depicted on the righthand side in Fig. 3. Finally, we construct all the compatibility pairs.
Fig. 3 graphically represents all the possible pairs whose elements are singleton sets.
Notice that linking local models inside a compatibility relation may force us to throw
away some of them. Consider, for instance, the case where we restrict the possible
situations in Fig. 3 to the local models for Mr.1 which allow for exactly one ball. This
2 Formally, the Cartesian product of a collection {Xi : i ∈ I } of sets is denoted by
∏
i∈I Xi and it is defined as
the set of all functions f with domain I such that f (i) ∈Xi for all i ∈ I .
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Fig. 7. The construction of a model.
fact, together with the definition of compatibility existing between the views of the two
observers, forces us to throw away all the pairs, and corresponding local models for Mr.2,
which allow for zero balls (see Fig. 3).
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Given a family of languages {Li}, different subclasses of models may be defined,
depending on the definition of compatibility relation. Different compatibility relations
model different situations. We introduce here two general classes of models which will
be used throughout the paper.
Definition 3.2 (Chain and chain model). A compatibility sequence c is a chain if |ci | = 1
for each i ∈ I . A model C is a chain model if all the c in C are chains.
Definition 3.3 (Weak chain and weak chain model). A compatibility sequence c is a weak
chain if |ci | 1 for each i ∈ I . A model C is a weak chain model if all the c in C are weak
chains.
3.2. Contexts
Given a model C = {〈c0, c1, . . . , ci , . . .〉} we formally define a context to be any ci ,
namely the set of local models m ∈Mi allowed by C within any particular compatibility
sequence.
The intuition underlying the definition of context is that, semantically, a context consists
of that set of models which captures exactly those facts which are locally true, given
also the constraints posed by the local models of other contexts in the same compatibility
sequence, as allowed by a given compatibility relation. Notice that this notion of context is
the semantic formalization of the notion of context intuitively introduced in Principle 1 in
Section 1. Notice also that defining a context as a set of models (instead of a single model)
enables us to formalize it as a partial object, as explicitly required in, e.g., [25,34]. This is
a key difference with possible worlds [32], which are complete objects (in the sense that a
formula is either true or false in a world). We illustrate the advantage of having contexts as
partial objects by using the following example.
Example 3.2. Consider the slightly modified magic box scenario depicted in Fig. 8, where
Mr.2 is able to see only one box sector and knows that there are two sectors behind the
wall. In this scenario Mr.2 is able to distinguish only two situations: there is a ball on the
left, and there is no ball on the left. The fact that Mr.2 is uncommitted to whether there is
a ball in a sector behind the wall is formalized by having the sentence “there is a ball on
the right” true in some local models representing Mr.2’s view and false in others. In the
resulting context, describing Mr.2’s viewpoint, “there is a ball on the right” will be neither
true nor false because there will be models in c2 where the sentence is false and others
where the sentence is true. Fig. 9 graphically describes the compatibility pairs involving
Fig. 8. A new magic box.
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Fig. 9. Compatible contexts of Mr.1 and Mr.2 in the scenario of Fig. 8.
the four different possible situations for Mr.1 and the two different possible situations for
Mr.2. Note that, in this case, contrarily to what happens in Fig. 3, compatibility sequences
are not chains.
Given the above notion of context, we can now better understand the intuitions
underlying the notion of compatibility sequence, and that of compatibility relation (model).
A context is a partial description of the world. A compatibility sequence contains as many
contexts as needed, one for each partial description of the world. Thus, in the magic box
scenario we have compatibility sequences of length two, containing a context for the view
of Mr.1 and a context for the view of Mr.2. Similarly, in the scenario concerning reasoning
about belief we have two contexts, one each for the two mental images considered. In
the more general scenario involving n belief contexts, we have to consider sequences of
length n.
An interesting situation is the case of compatibility sequences in which all the contexts
are singleton sets, that is, the case of chains as introduced in Definition 3.2. In this case,
all the contexts are complete objects in the sense that each context, being a single model,
assigns a truth value to all sentences in its language. A context which is a singleton set
models the situation where a partial description of the world assigns a truth value to all
the propositions it is able to express in its local (and limited) language. This is the case in
Figs. 1, 2, and 3. Here, Mr.1 and Mr.2 have partial views of the world. However, within
their partial views, they are able to “see everything”.
A slightly different situation is the case of weak chains, introduced in Definition 3.3.
In this case each context is either a singleton set (|ci | = 1) or an empty set (|ci | < 1).
This means that a context is either a complete object, in the sense discussed above, or an
inconsistent object. Indeed, in the latter case, being an empty set of models, a context
assigns the truth value “true” to all sentences in its language, therefore describing an
inconsistent situation.
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3.3. Local satisfiability, satisfiability, and logical consequence
We can now say what it means for a model to satisfy a formula of a language Li . Let
cl be the (classical) satisfiability relation between local models and formulae of Li . Let
us call cl local satisfiability. Notationally, let us write i :φ to mean φ and that φ is a
formula of Li . We say that φ is an Li -formula, and that i :φ is a formula or, also, a labelled
Li -formula. This notation and terminology allows us to keep track of the context we are
talking about. Then we have the following:
Definition 3.4 (Satisfiability). Let C = {c}, with c = 〈c0, c1, . . . , ci , . . .〉, be a model and
i :φ a formula. C satisfies i :φ, in symbols C  i :φ, if for all c ∈C
ci  φ,
where ci  φ if, for all m ∈ ci , m cl φ.
Intuitively: an Li -formula is satisfied by a model C if all the local models in each ith
context satisfy it. A model C satisfies a set of formulae Γ , in symbols C  Γ , if C satisfies
every formula i :φ in Γ .
The notion of validity is the obvious one.
Definition 3.5 (Validity). A formula i :φ is valid, in symbols  i :φ, if all models satisfy
i :φ.
What is more interesting is the notion of logical consequence which must take into
account the fact that assumptions and conclusion may belong to distinct languages. Given
a set of labelled formulae Γ , Γj denotes the set of formulae {γ | j :γ ∈ Γ }.
Definition 3.6 (Logical consequence with respect to a model). A formula i :φ is a logical
consequence of a set of formulae Γ with respect to a model C, in symbols Γ C i :φ, if
every sequence c ∈ C satisfies:
∀j ∈ I, j 
= i, cj  Γj ⇒ (∀m ∈ ci , m cl Γi ⇒ m cl φ). (1)
Intuitively: take a model C and a formula i :φ. Take a set of assumptions Γ and, among
them, isolate the set of assumptions Γj with j 
= i . Take all the sequences in C whose local
models in cj satisfy Γj (and throw away all the others). Consider now the local models in
ci of the remaining sequences. Γ C i :φ if in these remaining local models all the local
models which satisfy Γi locally satisfy φ. Essentially, the intuition is that the formulae in
Γj prune away compatibility sequences, while the formulae in Γi prune away local models
in ci . This is due to the fact that the assumptions Γj (j 
= i) made in the context cj induce
“compatible” assumptions in other contexts, and in particular in the context ci . This, in
turn, results in pruning away compatibility sequences. The role of the assumptions Γi is
instead the usual one, that is, that of pruning away local models of Li .
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Fig. 10. Selecting compatibility sequences.
Example 3.3. Consider the model of the magic box informally depicted in Fig. 3, whose
content has been informally described in Example 3.1. We want to verify that in this model
if Mr.1 sees a ball on the left and Mr.2 doesn’t see any ball on the right,
then Mr.2 sees a ball on the left or in the center. (2)
Following Definition 3.6, the first step is to isolate all the pairs whose local models
satisfy the property that Mr.1 sees a ball on the left, and throw away all the others. The
remaining compatibility pairs are depicted in Fig. 10. The second step is to isolate all the
Mr.2’s local models in the remaining pairs such that there are no balls on the right. The
remaining Mr.2’s local models are depicted in Fig. 11. The last step is to check whether the
remaining Mr.2’s local models represent the fact that Mr.2 sees a ball on the left or in the
center. It is easy to see that all the remaining local models in Fig. 11 satisfy this property.
Therefore the model depicted in Fig. 3 satisfies (2).
A formula i :φ is a logical consequence of a set of formulae Γ with respect to a class of
models M, in symbols Γ M i :φ, if i :φ is a logical consequence of Γ with respect to all
the models in M. We say also that i :φ is an M-logical consequence of Γ . Finally, a formula
i :φ is a logical consequence of Γ , in symbols Γ  i :φ, if i :φ is a logical consequence of
Γ with respect to all the models C.
The notion of logical consequence introduced in this section extends the notion of local
logical consequence.
Theorem 3.1 (Extension with respect to local logical consequence). Let Γ be a set of
formulae. If Γi cl φ, then Γ  i :φ.
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Fig. 11. Selecting local models.
Proof. Γi cl φ implies that, for any local model m of Li , if Γi holds, then φ holds as well.
Therefore, the fact that for all m ∈ ci , if m cl Γi then m cl φ is trivially true. This ends
the proof. ✷
The converse (i.e., if Γ  i :φ then Γi cl φ) is not, in general, true. Trivially this is due
to the possible existence of assumptions made in contexts with index j 
= i .
Notice that, if we restrict ourselves to consider classes of weak chain models, then
Definition 3.6 can be simplified as follows: Γ C i :φ if
∀j ∈ I, cj  Γj ⇒ ci  φ. (3)
The proof is straightforward. From the hypothesis that |ci | 1, Eq. (1) can be rewritten
as
∀j ∈ I, j 
= i, cj  Γj ⇒ (ci  Γi ⇒ ci  φ)
which is, in turn, equivalent to Eq. (3). The notion of logical consequence given in Eq. (3)
was first introduced in [29], where the authors define a semantics for an MC system
formalizing meta-reasoning, called MK.
Notice also that the simplified notion of logical consequence given in Eq. (3) can be
further simplified in the case of chain models. Indeed, from the fact that each ci contains a
single local model mi , it follows that Eq. (3) can be rewritten as follows:
∀j ∈ I, mj cl Γj ⇒ mi cl φ. (4)
As it will be clear in Section 4.1, this simplified notion of logical consequence applies
to the magic box scenario graphically described in Figs. 1, 2, and 3.
3.4. The principles of locality and compatibility
The notions of model, context, satisfiability, and logical consequence given in this
section formalize the principles of locality and compatibility in the following sense:
Locality. Everything is local. First of all, the language is local: not only do we have a
language for each context, but, also, there is no notion of a not labelled Li -formula φ
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being satisfiable. We always talk of satisfiability of formulae in context, i.e., of labelled
Li -formulae. Second, the notion of satisfiability is local: the satisfiability of a (labelled)
formula is given in terms of the local satisfiability of the formula with respect to its context.
Third, the structures we consider to test local satisfiability are local: contexts have their
own, generally different, domains of interpretation, sets of relations, and sets of functions.
Compatibility. Because of compatibility sequences, contexts mutually influence them-
selves. Compatibility has the structural effect of changing the set of local models defining
each context. It forces local models to agree up to a certain extent. On the one extreme,
any two contexts have two independent views of the world. In this case the compatibility
relation allows for every pair of sets of local models and there is no relation between what
holds in the distinct sets of local models. On the other extreme, any two contexts describe
the same world from the same perspective. In this case all the languages are the same, for
every local model in a context there is a corresponding compatible identical local model
in the other context. In this case all the contexts are a replication of the same context, a
compatibility relation is a set of sequences of identical contexts, and we are essentially in
the classical situation of one language and one notion of satisfiability and truth.
4. The two examples—model theory
Let us see how the two examples introduced in Section 2 can be modeled by using Local
Models Semantics.
4.1. Reasoning with viewpoints
Let us start by defining the propositional languages L1 and L2 used by Mr.1 and Mr.2,
respectively, to describe their views. Let P1 = {r, l} and P2 = {r, c, l} be two sets of
propositional constants (where intuitively, r, c, l stand for ball on the right, in the center
and on the left, respectively). L1 is formally defined as the smallest set containing P1, the
symbol for falsity ⊥, and closed under implication; L2 is formally defined as the smallest
set containing P2, the symbol for falsity ⊥ and closed under implication. 3
L1 and L2 have the usual propositional semantics. The local models of L1 are
(univocally defined by the following sets of formulae):
m1 = ∅, m2 = {l}, m3 = {r}, m4 = {l, r},
where we write ∅ to mean the local model describing the situation with no balls in the box,
{l} to mean the local model describing the situation with a ball on the left, and so on for the
other cases. Analogously, the local models of L2 are (univocally defined by the following
sets of formulae):
m1 = ∅, m2 = {l}, m3 = {c}, m4 = {r},
m5 = {l, c}, m6 = {l, r}, m7 = {c, r}, m8 = {l, c, r}.
3 In this paper we use the standard abbreviations from propositional logic, such as ¬φ for φ ⊃⊥, φ ∨ ψ for
¬φ ⊃ ψ , φ ∧ψ for ¬(¬φ ∨¬ψ),  for ⊥⊃⊥.
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Following the definition given in Section 3, a generic compatibility relation C for the
magic box is a relation
C ⊆ 2M1 × 2M2,
where M1 (M2) is the set of propositional models of L1 (L2). A compatibility pair
〈c1, c2〉 ∈ C is a pair of sets of local models, being c1 a set of models of the view of
Mr.1 and c2 a set of models of the view of Mr.2.
Let us construct a model for the scenario described in Fig. 3 (Section 2.1), by imposing
the following compatibility constraints:
if Mr.1 sees at least one ball, then Mr.2 sees at least one ball, (5)
if Mr.2 sees at least one ball, then Mr.1 sees at least one ball, (6)
Mr.1 and Mr.2 are able to construct a complete description of their view. (7)
Definition 4.1 (A model for the magic box). A model C for the magic box is a
compatibility relation such that, for all c ∈C
if for all m ∈ c1, m 
= ∅, then for all m ∈ c2, m 
= ∅, (8)
if for all m ∈ c2, m 
= ∅, then for all m ∈ c1, m 
= ∅, (9)
|c1| = 1 and |c2| = 1. (10)
Eq. (8) models constraint (5). In fact, if Mr.1 sees a ball then this ball can be on the
left or on the right and the local model ∅ cannot represent his view. Furthermore, in this
case, Mr.2 sees a ball in one of the three possible positions, and, therefore the local model
∅ does not represent the view of Mr.2. A similar explanation can be given for Eq. (9),
which models constraint (6). Eq. (10) is more interesting. It says that c1 and c2 contain
a single local model, i.e., the magic box model is a chain model. This intuitively means
that Mr.1 and Mr.2 have a complete model of their point of view about the box, namely,
that both Mr.1 and Mr.2 see the box (from their point of view) and are able to construct
a complete description of it. As a consequence of Eq. (10), a model C for the magic box
example in Fig. 3 is a set of pairs 〈{m1}, {m2}〉 where m1 and m2 are local models of L1
and L2, respectively. Each pair corresponds to a possible combination of the observers’
partial views.
Notice that Eq. (10) cannot be used in defining a model for the scenario depicted in
Fig. 8. Indeed in that scenario Mr.2 is not able to construct a complete description of the
box. Therefore the requirement |c2| = 1 must be removed from Eq. (10). Models for the
scenario depicted in Fig. 8 are therefore sets of pairs 〈{m1}, c2〉 where c2 may contain
different local models.
From now on, we call V the class of models introduced in Definition 4.1; we refer to a
model in V as V-model for short, and to the logical consequence with respect to the class of
V-models as V-logical consequence, in symbols V. The V-model containing all and only
the chains depicted in Fig. 3 is the following:
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

〈{¬l,¬r}, {¬l,¬c,¬r}〉
〈{l,¬r}, {l,¬c,¬r}〉
〈{l,¬r}, {¬l, c,¬r}〉
〈{l,¬r}, {¬l, c, r}〉
. . .
〈{l, r}, {l, c,¬r}〉
〈{l, r}, {l, c, r}〉


.
The models in V are all subsets of this model.
Example 4.1. It is easy to see that in all the V-models, if Mr.1 sees no balls then Mr.2
sees no balls (formally, 1 :¬l ∧¬r V 2 :¬l ∧¬c ∧¬r).
To prove this, let us consider all the pairs 〈c1, c2〉 such that c1 satisfies ¬l∧¬r . Suppose
that there exists a c2 which does not satisfy ¬l ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬r . From Eq. (10) we know
that c2 contains exactly a propositional local model. Therefore, c2 satisfies l ∨ c ∨ r and
the local model contained in c2 is not ∅. From Eq. (9) we obtain that, for all m ∈ c1,
m 
= ∅. This is impossible because, from the hypothesis, we know that c1 satisfies ¬l∧¬r .
Therefore the hypothesis that c2 does not satisfy ¬l ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬r must be false. Thus
1 :¬l ∧¬r V 2 :¬l ∧¬c ∧¬r .
In a similar way, we can also prove the dual, that is, 2 :¬l ∧¬c ∧¬r V 1 :¬l ∧¬r .
These two logical consequences express the fact that
for all m ∈ c1, m= ∅ if and only if for all m ∈ c2, m= ∅ (11)
holds in Definition 4.1. It is easy to notice that Eqs. (8), (9), and (11) capture all the
compatibility pairs represented in Fig. 3 (Eq. (11) capturing the one at the top). Eq. (10) in
Definition 4.1 could therefore be substituted with Eq. (11).
4.2. Reasoning about belief
We consider a scenario involving an infinite chain of belief contexts, that is, an agent a
able to express and reason about beliefs of arbitrary nesting. Let us start by defining the
languages L0,L1,L2, . . . (over I =N, where N is the set of natural numbers including 0),
where the language L0 is the language of context a, the language L1 is the language of
context aa, the languageLn is the language of context aa . . . a (n+1 times), and so on. To
express statements about the world, every Ln contains a set P of propositional constants.
To express beliefs about beliefs described with Ln+1, Ln contains a predicate B , which
intuitively stands for belief, and a name “φ” for each formula φ in Ln+1. Since each context
is “above” an infinite chain and each level corresponds to a level of nesting of the belief
predicate, all the languages Li , with i ∈ N, must have the same expressibility. Therefore,
all languages are the same language L(B) containing all the propositional formulae φ,
B(“φ”), B(“B(“φ”)”), B(“B(“B(“φ”)”)”), and so on.
Formally, we define L(B) as follows. Let L be a propositional language containing a set
P of propositional letters, the symbol for falsity ⊥, and closed under implication. Then for
any natural number i ∈N, we define a language Li as follows:
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• if φ ∈L, then φ ∈ Li ;
• ⊥ ∈ Li ;
• if φ ∈Li and ψ ∈ Li , then φ ⊃ψ ∈ Li ;
• if φ ∈Li , then B(“φ”) ∈Li+i ;
• nothing else is in Li .
L(B) is defined as the union of all the Ln, i.e., L(B)=⋃n∈NLn.
From now on we call HMB languages (where HMB stands for Hierarchical Multilan-
guage Belief ) the family {Li} of languages over the set of indexes N such that for every
i ∈N, Li = L(B).
An HMB language {Li} is a family of propositional languages containing the
propositional letters in P , used to express statements about the world, and “special”
propositional letters B(“φ”), used to express beliefs about beliefs. Hence each Li has the
usual propositional semantics. The local models of each Li are univocally defined by a
subset of propositional letters in P and a subset of “special” propositional letters of the
form B(“φ”). The satisfiability relation is the usual one between propositional models and
propositional formulae.
Following the definition given in Section 3, a generic compatibility relation C for an
HMB language is a relation
C ⊆
∏
i∈N
2Mi ,
where eachMi is the set of propositional models ofLi . A sequence 〈c0, c1, . . . , ci , . . .〉 ∈C
is a sequence of sets of local models, c0 being a set of models of a, c1 a set of models of
aa, and so on. A set of sequences (i.e., a model of an HMB language) formalizes different
sequences of mental images (contexts) that a has of itself, its own beliefs, its beliefs about
beliefs, and so on, in possibly different situations.
Let us construct a model for a class of HMB languages by imposing the following
compatibility constraints:
whenever it believes B(“φ”), then a believes that it believes φ; (12)
a believes B(“φ”) only if
it believes that it believes φ in all the admissible situations. (13)
Let us first consider constraint (12). Semantically, (12) imposes that, for all the
compatibility sequences c in a model C, if ci satisfies B(“φ”), then ci+1 satisfies φ. In
order to define the structural relation formalizing (12) we introduce some extra notation.
• Let ci be an element of a compatibility sequence c. We write Θ(ci ) to mean the set
of Li -formulae which are satisfied by all the local models in ci . Formally,
Θ(ci )= {φ | ∀m ∈ ci m cl φ}.
• Let Γ be a set of Li -formulae. We write B−1(“Γ ”) to mean the set of Li+1-formulae
φ such that B(“φ”) belongs to Γ .
Θ(ci ) characterizes the formulae satisfied by the ith context in a sequence c, while
B−1(“Γ ”) characterizes a set of formulae obtained by “removing” the belief operator B to
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a set of formulae Γ . The structural constraint modeling (12) is obtained by imposing that
all the sequences c in a model C satisfy the following property:
B−1(“Θ(ci )”)⊆Θ(ci+1). (14)
Eq. (14) imposes that all the Li+1-formulae obtained by “removing” the belief operator
B to the set of Li -formulae satisfied by ci are contained into the set Θ(ci+1) of formulae
satisfied by ci+1. This implies that for every sequence c ∈ C if ci satisfies B(“φ”), then
ci+1 satisfies φ.
Let us now turn to constraint (13). We start by noticing that different compatibility
sequences may have common parts. For instance, given two sequences 〈c0, c1, . . . , ci , . . .〉
and 〈c′0, c′1, . . . , c′i , . . .〉 in C, the two contexts ci and c′i may coincide (namely, ci = c′i ), or
partially coincide (namely, ci∩c′i 
= ∅). Among partially coinciding contexts, an interesting
case is given by c′i ⊆ ci . According to our interpretation of a belief context as a partial
description of a mental image, c′i ⊆ ci means that the description contained in the belief
context c′i is less partial (or more complete) than the one contained in ci . Notationally, if
c′i ⊆ ci we say that the sequence c′ is i-admissible for the sequence c. Analogously, we
say that all the elements c′j in c′ are i-admissible for the sequence c. Given a model C
and a compatibility sequence c, the notion of i-admissibility enables us to characterize the
set of sequences c′ ∈ C whose belief contexts c′i are less partial (or more complete) than
the belief context ci in the given c. The notion of i-admissibility is important whenever
we are interested in defining a compatibility relation C by imposing constraints on sets of
belief contexts belonging to different compatibility sequences. For instance, we may define
a compatibility relation C by imposing a certain relation between a belief context ci and
all its i-admissible sequences. Although this is slightly more complicated than defining
a compatibility relation simply by imposing a certain constraint on two (or more) belief
contexts ci , and cj in the same sequence (as, e.g., in Eq. (14)), it enables us to express
compatibility constraints involving more than one sequence at once. This is, in fact, also
the case for the modeling of constraint (13).
Semantically, constraint (13) imposes that, for all the compatibility sequences c in a
model C, ci satisfies B(“φ”) only if all the c′i+1, that are i-admissible for c, satisfy φ.
Notice that the notion of i-admissibility has been used here in order to model the informal
notion of admissibility in constraint (13). In order to formally define the structural relation
formalizing (13) we introduce some extra notation.
• Let C be a compatibility relation and c a compatibility sequence in C. We write
V ↓(ci ) to mean the set of Li+1-formulae which are satisfied by every element c′i+1
which is i-admissible for c. Formally,
V ↓(ci )=
{
φ ∈ Li+1 | ∀c′ ∈C, c′i ⊆ ci ⇒ φ ∈Θ(c′i+1)
}
.
• Let Γ be a set of Li -formulae, we write B(“Γ ”) to mean the set of Li−1-formulae
B(“φ”) such that φ belongs to Γ , i > 0;
V ↓(ci ) characterizes the formulae satisfied by all the (i + 1)th contexts within the
i-admissible sequences of a given sequence c. That is, given the set of sequences c′ ∈ C
whose belief contexts c′i are less partial than the belief context ci , V ↓(ci ) characterizes
the formulae satisfied by all the sequences c′ at one more nesting in the structure of belief
contexts with respect to ci . B(“Γ ”) characterizes sets of formulae obtained by “applying”
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the belief operator B to a set of formulae Γ . Constraint (13) is obtained by imposing that
all the sequences c in a model C satisfy the following property:
B(“V ↓(ci )”)⊆Θ(ci ). (15)
Eq. (15) imposes that all the Li -formulae obtained by applying the belief operator B to
the set of Li+1-formulae satisfied by the i-admissible sequences for c, are contained into
the set Θ(ci ) of formulae satisfied by ci . This implies that for every sequence c ∈ C, ci
satisfies B(“φ”) only if all the i-admissible sequences c′ of c are such that c′i+1 satisfies φ.
Definition 4.2 (HMB models). A model C for the belief example (HMB model) is a
compatibility relation satisfying at least one among properties (14) and (15).
Models satisfying Eq. (14) are calledRdw-models, models satisfying Eq. (15) are called
Rupr-models, and models satisfying both (14) and (15) are called MBK-models.
Example 4.2. For any MBK-model C and any i ∈N,
C  i :B(“φ ⊃ψ”)⊃ (B(“φ”)⊃ B(“ψ”)).
To prove this, we need to show that all the compatibility sequences in C satisfy
i :B(“φ ⊃ψ”)⊃ (B(“φ”)⊃ B(“ψ”)). Suppose that ci satisfies both B(“φ ⊃ ψ”) and
B(“φ”). From condition (14) in the definition of an MBK-model every c′i+1 i-admissible
for c satisfies both φ ⊃ ψ and φ. Being all the local models in c′i+1 propositional models,
they satisfy also ψ . Therefore, from condition (15) in the definition of MBK-model, ci
satisfies B(“ψ”).
5. The proof theory: MC systems
The goal of this section is to give a brief introduction to the notion of a formal system
allowing multiple contexts, called Multi-Context system (MC system), where contexts
are formalized proof-theoretically. MC systems were first introduced in [25]. A more
theoretical presentation is given in [27]. The formalization of MC systems used in this
paper was first given in [23]. The novelty here is that we show how MC systems actually
formalize the notions of locality and compatibility introduced in Section 1, that we use
them to formalize the magic box scenario, and that we provide soundness and completeness
results with respect to Local Models Semantics.
Definition 5.1 (MC system). Let I be a set of indexes. A Multi-Context system (MC
system) MS is a pair
MS = 〈{Ti},∆br〉,
where:
• for each i ∈ I , Ti = 〈Li,Ωi,∆i〉 is an axiomatic formal system where Li is the
language, Ωi ⊆ Li is the set of axioms, and ∆i is the set of inference rules;
• ∆br is a set of inference rules with premises and conclusions in different languages.
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An MC system is essentially a set of logical theories, plus a set of inference rules
which allow for the propagation of consequences among theories. MC systems are a
generalization of Natural Deduction (ND) systems [40]. The generalization amounts to
use formulae tagged with the language they belong to. This allows for the effective use
of the multiple languages. The deduction machinery of an MC system is composed of
two kinds of inference rules: the inference rules in each ∆i , called internal rules, and the
inference rules in ∆br , called bridge rules. Internal rules are inference rules with premises
and conclusions in the same language, while bridge rules are inference rules with premises
and conclusions belonging to different languages. Notationally, inference rules are written
as follows:
i :φ1 . . . i :φn
i :ψ
ir,
i1 :φ1 . . . in :φn
j :ψ
br,
where ir is an internal rule, while br is a bridge rule. Internal rules allow us to draw
consequences inside a theory, while bridge rules allow us to export results from one theory
to another. Indeed ir allows us to derive the formula ψ from the formulae φ1, . . . , φn in
the theory tagged with i , while br allows us to export the formula ψ to the theory tagged
with j because of the fact that all the φ1, . . . , φn are derivable in the theories tagged with
i1, . . . , in, respectively. From now on, we write ∆ to mean the deduction machinery of an
MC system, i.e., ∆ =⋃i∈I ∆i ∪∆br. Using ND and following [40] in the notation and
terminology, ∆ contains also inference rules which discharge assumptions, written as:
[k1 :γ1] [km :γm]
Π1 Πm
i1 :φ1 . . . in :φn ii+1 :φn+1 . . . in+m :φn+m
j :ψ
dr
dr represents an inference rule which allow to infer j :ψ from i1 :φ1, . . . , in :φn
discharging the assumptions k1 :γ1, . . . , km :γm.
Notationally, we use the Greek letter Π (possibly with subscripts) to denote deductions.
For instance, in the inference rule dr above, Π1 represents a deduction of ii+1 :φn+1 from
the assumption k1 :γ1.
In Fig. 12 we show the construction of an MC system containing three logical theories
and four bridge rules. We start from different languages, e.g., L1,L2, and L3. Then,
we associate each of them with a logical theory Ti = 〈Li,Ωi,∆i〉. Finally, we connect
different logical theories with bridge rules, e.g., br1,br2,br3, and br4. The final result is
an MC system.
Deductions in MC systems are trees of formulae built starting from a finite number of
assumptions and axioms, possibly belonging to distinct languages, and by applying a finite
number of inference rules. A formula i :φ is derivable from a set of formulae Γ in an
MC system MS, in symbols Γ  MS i :φ if there is a deduction with bottom formula i :φ
whose undischarged assumptions are in Γ . A formula i :φ is a theorem in MS, in symbols
 MS i :φ, if it is derivable from the empty set. The deductive closure of MS is denoted by
Th(MS) and is formally defined as Th(MS) = {i :φ | MS i :φ}. A deduction in an MC
system can be seen as composed of sub-deductions in distinct languages, obtained by
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Fig. 12. The construction of a MC system.
repeated applications of internal rules, any two or more sub-deductions being concatenated
by one or more applications of bridge rules. 4
4 MC systems can be thought of as particular Labelled Deductive Systems (LDSs) [17]. In particular MC
systems are LDSs where labels are used only to keep track of the language formulae belong to, and where
inference rules can be applied only to formulae belonging to the “appropriate” language.
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Given an MC system MS = 〈{Ti},∆br〉 we formally define a context ci to be the
set of Li -formulae belonging to the deductive closure Th(MS) of MS. Formally, ci =
Th(MS)∩Li .
The intuition underlying the notion of context is that, proof-theoretically, a context
consists of that set of formulae which are locally theorems, given also the theorems which
can be derived (via applications of bridge rules) from theorems in other contexts. It can be
noticed that the notion of context given above is the proof-theoretical counterpart of the
notion of context introduced in Section 3.2.
An MC system formalizes the principles of locality and compatibility in the following
sense:
Locality. First of all the signature and the notion of well formed formula is localized
and distinct for each context ci . This is achieved by providing a language Li to each
context ci . Second, the set of facts (axioms) Ωi which provides the context of reasoning
(namely, describes what is true in a context) is local to ci . Finally the inference engines
∆i are distinct for each context. This allows us to localize the form of reasoning to each
distinct context ci and to define special inference engines which exploit the local form of
formulae (e.g., we can use PROLOG on clausal languages) and capture different deduction
capabilities.
Compatibility. Bridge rules in ∆br formalize compatibility. Indeed via bridge rules,
contexts mutually influence themselves. For instance, a bridge rule
j :ψ
i :φ
has the effect of deriving φ in the context ci because of the fact that another formula, ψ ,
has been derived in the context cj . Bridge rules change the set of formulae derived in each
context. Bridge rules force contexts to agree up to a certain extent. On one extreme the
two contexts might have two independent views of the world. In this case we have a set of
bridge rules which is the empty set and there is no relation between what is derivable in
the distinct contexts. On the other extreme the two contexts describe the same world from
the same perspective. This situation can be imposed by asking that all the languages, sets
of axioms, and deduction rules are the same, and that the two contexts ci and cj are linked
by the following bridge rules:
i :φ
j :φ
,
j :φ
i :φ
.
In this case all the contexts consist of the same set of provable formulae.
6. The two examples—proof theory
Let us see how the two examples, described in Section 2, can be formalized using MC
systems.
6.1. Reasoning with viewpoints
Let us start by defining the MC system MV = 〈{T1, T2},∆br〉 modeling the magic box
scenario depicted in Fig. 3. Let the two languages used by Mr.1 and Mr.2 be the two
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propositional languages defined in Section 4.1, that is L1 (L2) is the smallest set containing
{r, l} ({r, c, l}) and closed under the standard propositional connectives. To the purpose of
this example we suppose thatΩ1 =Ω2 = ∅. This formalizes the fact that we do not commit
ourselves to any particular partial view among the ones depicted in Fig. 3. Since each
partial view is modeled using propositional models, both ∆1 and ∆2 contain the following
MC version of Natural Deduction rules for propositional calculus:
[i :φ] [i :¬φ]
Π Π
i :ψ
i :φ ⊃ ψ ⊃Ii ,
i :φ i :φ ⊃ψ
i :ψ
⊃Ei , i :⊥
i :φ
⊥i .
The key part in the construction of the MC system MV is the formalization of compatibility
constraints (5), (6), and (7) in Section 4.1. This is achieved by adding the following bridge
rules to ∆br
[2 :¬φ] [1 :¬φ]
Π Π
1 : l ∨ r
2 : l ∨ c∨ r br12,
2 : l ∨ c ∨ r
1 : l ∨ r br21,
1 :⊥
2 :φ
⊥12, 2 :⊥1 :φ ⊥21.
br12 formalizes constraint (5) in Section 4.1. In fact, if Mr.1 sees at least a ball in the box,
then 1 : l ∨ r is derivable in his context. Furthermore, in this case Mr.2 sees a ball in one of
the three possible positions, and therefore 2 : r ∨ c ∨ l is derivable in his context. A similar
explanation can be given for br21 which formalizes constraint (6) in Section 4.1. ⊥12 and
⊥21 formalize the fact that both Mr.1 and Mr.2 are able to construct a complete description
of their view, and are the proof theoretical counterpart of constraint (7) in Section 4.1. Let
us start by noticing that ⊥12 and ⊥21 are some kind of generalization of the classical law
of reasoning by absurdum. ⊥12 and ⊥21 can be intuitively motivated as follows. Since
we have contexts which are single models, then either φ or ¬φ holds. As a consequence,
if assuming ¬φ in one context generates an inconsistency in another context, then it is
possible to conclude that ¬φ doesn’t hold in the first context, and therefore that φ holds.
Example 6.1. In MV, if Mr.1 sees no balls, then Mr.2 sees no balls. Formally:
1 :¬l ∧¬r  MV 2 :¬l ∧¬c ∧¬r.
The proof in a Natural Deduction-like style is given in Fig. 13. Deductions local to the
contexts describing Mr.1 (Mr.2) are surrounded by boxes labelled Mr.1 (Mr.2). This
emphasizes the fact that a deduction in the MC system can be seen as composed of sub-
deductions in distinct languages (L1, and L2), obtained by repeated applications of internal
rules, these sub-deductions being concatenated by one or more applications of the bridge
rules in ∆br. Let us describe the deduction tree in detail. First we assume 2 : l ∨ c∨ r in
the context of Mr.2. Applying br21 to this formula we deduce 1 : l ∨ r in the context of
Mr.1. Then we assume 1 :¬l ∧¬r and applying ND rules of propositional calculus we
obtain 1 :¬(l ∨ r). From 1 : l ∨ r and 1 :¬(l ∨ r) we obtain 1 :⊥. Applying the bridge rule
⊥12 we deduce 2 :¬(l ∧ c∧ r) discharging the assumption 2 : l ∨ c ∨ r in the context of
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Fig. 13. A deduction tree in MV.
Mr.2. Finally we obtain 2 :¬l ∧¬c ∧¬r with a deduction involving rules of propositional
calculus.
The MC system MV presented in this section can be proved to be a sound and complete
axiomatization of the Local Models Semantics for the magic box scenario presented in
Section 4.1, Fig. 3. This result is stated and proved in Appendix A.
6.2. Reasoning about belief
The idea underlying the formalization of the belief example using MC systems is
straightforward. Every view is formalized by a theory Ti . To obtain the desired behavior,
that is to make a able to reason about its own beliefs, it is sufficient to “link” deduction
in the theory representing a’s beliefs and deduction in the theory representing the mental
images that a has of itself. “Links” are provided by bridge rules. Depending on the kind of
bridge rule, a will have different reasoning capabilities.
Formally, an HMB system is an MC system 〈{Ti},∆br〉 defined over the index I = N.
For every i ∈ N, the language Li of the theory Ti is the language L(B) defined in
Section 4.2. For this example we assume Ωi = ∅. Since each view is modeled using
propositional models, each ∆i contains the MC version of Natural Deduction rules for
propositional calculus described in Section 6.1. The key part in the construction of an
HMB system is the formalization of compatibility constraints (12) and (13) in Section 4.2.
This is achieved by adding the following bridge rules to ∆br:
i :B(“φ”)
i + 1 :φ Rdwi ,
i + 1 :φ
i :B(“φ”)
Rupri .
RESTRICTIONS: Rupri is applicable if and only if i + 1 :φ does not depend on any
assumption j :ψ with index j  i + 1.
Rdwi formalizes constraint (12) in Section 4.2. IfB(“φ”) is assumed in the context ci , then
a is able to conclude that φ holds in the context ci+1. Rupri formalizes constraint (13) in
Section 4.2. If a is able to infer φ in the context ci+1 from a set of assumptions with index
j < i + 1, then φ holds in all the contexts c′i+1 compatible with such a set of assumptions.
In this case, and only in this case, a is able to infer B(“φ”) in the context ci . Intuitively,
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Fig. 14. A deduction tree in MBK.
the restriction on Rupri prevents the case in which a consequence of an assumption in a
belief context is treated, by the context above, as a theorem of that belief context. Notice
that, the restriction on Rupri corresponds to the fact that constraint (13) involves sets of
i-admissible sequences.
The HMB system containing only bridge rules of the form Rdwi is called Rdw; the
HMB system containing only bridge rules of the form Rupri is called Rupr; the HMB
system containing both Rdwi and Rupri is called MBK. Giunchiglia and Serafini [27]
show that, in MBK, the theory of each view is theorem equivalent with the minimal normal
modal logic K. For a detailed investigation on MC systems obtained by imposing different
combinations of bridge rules of the form Rup and Rdw, called reflection rules, good
references are [10,11], where different MC systems for the formalization of meta-reasoning
are defined and studied. Another reference is [18] where Local Models Semantics is used
to define classes of models for MC systems containing different reflection rules.
Example 6.2. It is easy to see that for any i ∈N,
 MBK i :B(“φ ⊃ψ”)⊃
(
B(“φ”)⊃ B(“ψ”)).
The proof in a Natural Deduction-like style is given in Fig. 14. Let us describe it in
detail. First, we assume i :B(“φ”) and i :B(“φ ⊃ψ”) in the context ci . Applying Rdwi
to these formulae we deduce i + 1 :φ and i + 1 :φ ⊃ψ in ci+1 and we obtain i + 1 :ψ in
the same context by propositional reasoning. Applying the bridge rule Rupri we deduce
i :B(“ψ”). Then we obtain i :B(“φ ⊃ψ”)⊃ (B(“φ”)⊃ B(“ψ”)) by applying the ⊃Ii rule
two times and discharging the assumptions i :B(“φ”) and i :B(“φ ⊃ψ”).
The MC systems Rdw, Rupr and MBK presented in this section can be proved to
be sound and complete with respect to the class of Rdw-models, Rupr-models, MBK-
models, respectively, defined in Section 4.2. This result is stated and proved in Appendix B.
As a consequence of this result, the class of MBK-models formalizes an ideal agent a
theorem equivalent to the minimal normal modal logics K. On the other hand, Rdw-
models andRupr-models formalize agents having extremely weak reasoning capabilities.
Notice therefore that the representation of an agent’s beliefs based on the notion of
local semantics and compatibility relation provides enough modularity and flexibility to
model agents with different reasoning capabilities in a uniform way. Ghidini [19] gives
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a more general definition of HMB model and shows how various forms of ideal and real
agents (including agents with bounded reasoning capabilities) are modeled by using Local
Models Semantics. Notice also how we construct the models of combinations of constraints
(e.g., the MBK-model) simply by taking the intersection of the models of the constituent
constraints (e.g., constraints modeled by Eqs. (14) and (15)).
7. Other frameworks—a comparison
The obvious, most studied, framework to start from is possible worlds semantics [32].
Both Local Models Semantics and possible worlds semantics allow for multiple objects
(models or worlds) and have a notion of local satisfiability (to a local model, to a possible
world). However there are also some important differences. First, in possible worlds there
is a unique language which describes what is true in all the worlds and there is no
notion of truth of a labelled formula. This is the case also for the extensions of possible
worlds semantics aimed at formalizing local reasoning (see, e.g., [13]), where localization
is achieved by adding a new modal operator to the language. Second, worlds are not
(Tarskian) models, the key difference being that possible worlds allow for the use of modal
operators. The satisfiability of a formula containing a modal operator is defined in terms
of the accessibility relation, which must therefore be given while defining satisfiability in a
world. The notion of satisfiability in a world is a function of the model of which the world
is part. This is not the case for Local Models Semantics where each local model has its own
notion of satisfiability. In Local Models Semantics, the model and its structure influence
only the set of local models under consideration. The hypothesis of using a single unique
global language and of being able to describe a priori the structure of the model under
consideration is very useful and works in many situations. It does not seem to work in
those cases where there is no global scheme describing the system, e.g., the federation of
heterogeneous data or knowledge bases or multi-agent systems.
In the last few years various semantics for contextual reasoning have been proposed.
Most of them are based on possible worlds semantics. As far as we know, the first attempt
is described in [29]. In this work there is a notion of labelled formula and of (local)
satisfiability to a set of (local) possible worlds. This semantics works well for contextual
logics equivalent to modal K or stronger. Its main limitation is that it is not clear how
to extend it to other logics, e.g., nonnormal modal logics or logics for reasoning with
viewpoints.
Guha, in his Ph.D. Thesis [31], informally describes a semantics for reasoning with
context. Understanding Guha’s informal definitions is a non-trivial task. Some of the main
ideas seem the following. There is a single global language from which it is possible to
extract the (local) languages of all the contexts. There seems to be a notion of satisfaction
of labelled formulae, and a notion of labelled formulae being meaningless in a context.
There is distinguished symbol ist, whose intuitive meaning is “is true”, which seems
treated as a modal operator. Guha’s semantics has been partially formalized in the work by
Buvac and his co-authors (see for instance [7]). Buvac’s semantics seems to have the same
features and defects as the semantics in [29], with the further complication that, starting
from a single language, there is a lot of work to do in order to achieve locality. In particular
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the formulae of the global language which are meaningless in a context must be treated as
such (this is done using Bochvar three valued logic).
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a new semantics, called Local Models Semantics, and
proposed it as a foundation for reasoning with context. Local Models Semantics formalizes
the two general principles underlying contextual reasoning, namely the principle of locality
and the principle of compatibility. Finally, we have shown how Local Models Semantics
can be used to model two important forms of contextual reasoning, namely reasoning with
viewpoints and reasoning about belief.
Despite their (apparent) simplicity, the examples proposed in Section 2 show how the
semantics and methodology developed in this paper can be applied, suitably modified,
to the modeling of important problems. The work in [20] starts from the intuitions and
the semantics presented in Sections 2.1 and 4.1 and defines a context-based logic for
distributed representation and reasoning, called Distributed First Order Logics. Distributed
First Order Logics has been successfully applied to model important theoretical aspects
of federations of heterogeneous data or knowledge bases in [22]. The work in [4,16,19]
suitably generalizes the intuitions and the formalization proposed in Sections 2.2 and 4.2
in order to model different aspects of agents and multi-agent systems.
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Appendix A. Viewpoints—soundness and completeness
The goal of this section is to show that the MC system for viewpoints MV defined
in Section 6.1 is sound and complete with respect to the class of models V defined in
Section 4.1. In Section A.1 we prove the Soundness theorem and in Section A.2 the
Completeness theorem. The main body of this section concentrates on the proof of the
Completeness theorem and on a method for constructing canonical models Cc.
A.1. The proof of soundness
Theorem A.1 (Soundness theorem). If Γ  MV k :φ, then Γ V k :φ.
This theorem states that the calculus provided using the MC system MV computes a
derivability relation which is a subset of the consequence relation on models MV.
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Proof of Theorem A.1. The proof is by induction on the structure of the derivation of k :φ
from Γ .
Base case : If Γ  MV k :φ with a zero steps derivation, then k :φ ∈ Γ . Thus Γ V k :φ
from the definition of consequence relation.
⊃Ik: If Γ  MV k :φ ⊃ψ and the last rule used is ⊃Ik , then Γ,k :φ V k :ψ holds from
the inductive hypothesis. Let C be a V-model and c ∈ C be a sequence such that
cj satisfies the formulae in Γj , j 
=k. Let m be a model in ck which satisfies all
the formulae in Γk . From the inductive hypothesis m cl φ implies m cl ψ . Thus
m cl φ ⊃ψ and Γ V k :φ ⊃ψ .
⊃Ek: If Γ  MV k :ψ and the last rule used is ⊃Ek , then there are two formulae k :φ and
k :φ ⊃ψ such that both Γ V k :φ and Γ V k :φ ⊃ψ hold from the inductive
hypothesis. Let C be a V-model and c ∈ C be a sequence such that cj satisfies the
formulae in Γj , j 
=k. Let m be a model in ck which satisfies all the formulae in
Γk . From the inductive hypothesis m cl φ and m cl φ ⊃ ψ . Thus m cl ψ and
Γ V k :ψ .
⊥k: If Γ  MV k :φ and the last rule used is ⊥k , then Γ,k :¬φ V k :⊥ holds from the
inductive hypothesis. Let C be a V-model and c ∈ C be a sequence such that cj
satisfies the formulae in Γj , j 
=k . Let m be a model in ck which satisfies all the
formulae in Γk . From the inductive hypothesis m cl ¬φ implies m cl ⊥. From
the definition of satisfiability in a propositional model it follows that m cl φ.
Thus Γ V k :φ.
br12: If Γ  MV 2 : l ∨ c∨ r and the last rule used is br12, then Γ V 1 : l ∨ r holds from
the inductive hypothesis. Let C be a V-model and c ∈ C be a sequence such that
c1 satisfies Γ1. Let m ∈ c2 be a local model such that m cl Γ2. Both c1 and c2
are singleton sets. Therefore c2 satisfies Γ2 and for every m ∈ c1 m cl Γ1. From
the inductive hypothesis, it follows that for every m ∈ c1 m cl l ∨ r , i.e., m 
= ∅.
By Eq. (8) in Definition 4.1 every m ∈ c2 is different from ∅. Thus every m ∈ c2
satisfy l ∨ c ∨ r and Γ V 2 : l ∨ c ∨ r holds.
br21: Similar to br12.
⊥12: Γ  MV 2 :φ and the last rule used is ⊥12. From the inductive hypothesis
Γ,2 :¬φ V 1 :⊥ holds. Let C be a V-model and c ∈C be a sequence such that c1
satisfies the formulae in Γ1. We must show that for everym ∈ c2, m cl Γ2 implies
m cl φ. Let m ∈ c2 be a model satisfying Γ2, and suppose that m ¬φ. Both c1
and c2 are singleton sets. Therefore, c2  ¬φ and, from the inductive hypothesis,
every m ∈ c1 satisfies ⊥. From the definition of satisfiability in propositional
models it follows that c2  ¬φ. Again, being c2 a singleton set, this implies
c2  φ, i.e., for every m ∈ c2, m cl φ. Thus Γ V 2 :φ holds.
⊥21: Similar to ⊥12. ✷
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A.2. The proof of completeness
Theorem A.2 (Completeness theorem). If Γ V k :φ, then Γ  MV k :φ.
This theorem, together with the soundness theorem, states that the calculus provided
using MV systems computes a derivability relation which coincides with the consequence
relation on the set of V-models.
The contrapositive will be proved: it will be shown that if Γ MV k :φ, then there exists
a V-model Cc containing a sequence c such that cj satisfies Γj for every j 
= k, and ck
contains a model m satisfying Γk and not satisfying φ. The proof is via the construction
of a “canonical model” in which the required sequence c can always be found. As with
the canonical model proof of completeness for propositional logic the idea relies upon
the being able to construct maximally consistent sets of formulae and being able to use
them in defining canonical models. The situation in MC systems is slightly complicated
by the division of the system into different languages. To make this possible, a form
of consistency and maximal consistency, which generalize the analogous concepts given
in [8], are defined.
Definition A.1 (k-consistency). Given an MC system MS, a set of indexed formulae
Γ ∈ {Li} is k-consistent if Γ MS k :⊥.
Definition A.2 (Maximal-k-consistency). Given an MC system MS, a set of indexed
formulae Γ ∈ {Li} is maximal-k-consistent if it is k-consistent and the only k-consistent
set of formulae containing Γ is Γ itself.
In the following we first concentrate on a method for constructing constructing the
canonical model Cc. Once defined the canonical model Cc, we will be able to prove the
Completeness theorem at the end of the section. The definition of a canonical model for
MV is composed by the following steps:
(1) We generalize the Lindenbaum’s theorem [8] by showing that for any k-consistent
set of formulae Γ there exists a maximal-k-consistent set Γ ′ with Γ ⊆ Γ ′
(Lemma A.1).
(2) We show some relevant properties of Γ ′ (Corollary A.1).
(3) We define the canonical model Cc as a compatibility relation over sets of (local)
models satisfying maximal-k-consistent sets of formulae (Definition A.4). We show
that Cc is a V-model (Lemma A.4).
Lemma A.1. For any k-consistent set of formulae Γ there exists a maximal-k-consistent
set Γ ′ such that Γ ⊆ Γ ′.
Proof. Let i1 :φ1, i2 :φ2, . . . be any enumeration of all the formulae in {L1,L2}. Define
Γ 0,Γ 1, . . . inductively as follows:
• Γ 0 = Γ ;
• if Γ n ∪ {in :φn} is k-consistent then Γ n+1 = Γ n ∪ {in :φn}, otherwise Γ n+1 = Γ n.
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Γ ′ =⋃i∈NΓ i . Let us prove that Γ ′ is k-consistent. Suppose not. Then there is a deduction
of k :⊥ from a finite set Γ f ⊆ Γ ′. Then there is an n such that Γ f ⊆ Γ n. But this means
that Γ n is not k-consistent which is a contradiction.
Having shown that Γ ′ is k-consistent, we next show that Γ ′ is maximal-k-consistent.
Suppose that there exists a maximal-k-consistent set of formulae ∆ with Γ ′ ⊆ ∆. Let
in :φn ∈∆, then Γ n ∪ {in :φn} is k-consistent and hence in :φn ∈ Γ ′. Thus ∆= Γ ′. ✷
Definition A.3 (Maximal-Lk-consistent). A set of formulae Γ is maximal-Lk-consistent
if it is k-consistent and for all Lk-formulae φ either k :φ ∈ Γ or k :¬φ ∈ Γ .
Corollary A.1. Let Γ ′ be maximal-k-consistent set of formulae.
(i) if 1 : l ∨ r ∈ Γ ′ then 2 : l ∨ c ∨ r ∈ Γ ′;
(ii) if 2 : l ∨ c∨ r ∈ Γ ′ then 2 : l ∨ r ∈ Γ ′;
(iii) for each i ∈ {1,2}, Γ ′i is maximal-Li-consistent.
Proof.
(i) Suppose that 1 : l ∨ r ∈ Γ ′ and 2 : l ∨ c ∨ r /∈ Γ ′. Both 1 : l ∨ r and 2 : l ∨ c∨ r
occur in some point of the enumeration i1 :φ1, i2 :φ2, . . . . Then there are two
sets Γ j1 ⊆ Γ ′ and Γ j2 ⊆ Γ ′ such that Γ j1 ∪ 1 : l ∨ r is k-consistent and Γ j2 ∪
2 : l ∨ c ∨ r is not. If j1 < j2 then 1 : l ∨ r ∈ Γ j2 . We know that Γ j2 ∪ 2 : l ∨ c∨ r
is not k-consistent, i.e., there exists a deduction Π of k :⊥ from Γ j2 ∪ 2 : l ∨ c ∨ r .
Being 1 : l ∨ r ∈ Γ j2 , the following deduction
Γ j2
1 : l ∨ r
2 : l ∨ c∨ r
Π
k : ⊥
br12
is a deduction of k :⊥ from Γ j2 . This is impossible because Γ j2 is k-consistent.
In a similar way we show that this holds even if j2 < j1. So if 1 : l ∨ r ∈ Γ ′ then
2 : l ∨ c ∨ r ∈ Γ ′.
(ii) Similar to (i).
(iii) If i = k then the proof follows from the fact that each theory in MV is closed under
propositional logic. Let’s consider the case i 
= k. First we have to prove that Γ ′i
is i-consistent. Suppose not, then there exists a deduction Π of i :⊥ from Γ ′.
Applying the bridge rule ⊥ik the following deduction
[k :¬A] Γ ′ [k :¬¬A] Γ ′
Π Π
i :⊥
k :A
⊥ik i :⊥
k :¬A ⊥ik
k :⊥
is a deduction of k :⊥ from Γ ′. This is impossible because Γ ′ is k-consistent.
ThereforeΓ ′i is i-consistent. Suppose now that that neither i :φ, nor i :¬φ belong to
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Γ ′. Both i :φ and i :¬φ occur in some point of the enumeration i1 :φ1, i2 :φ2, . . . .
Then there are two sets Γ j1 ⊆ Γ ′ and Γ j2 ⊆ Γ ′ such that both Γ j1 ∪ i :φ and
Γ j2 ∪ i :¬φ are not k-consistent. Suppose j1 < j2 (the case j1 > j2 is similar).
Then Γ j2 ∪ i :φ is not k-consistent. By Lemma A.2 it follows that Γ j2 is not
k-consistent as well. But this is impossible. Therefore the hypothesis that neither
i :φ, nor ¬i :φ belong to Γ ′ must be false. This allows us to conclude that each Γ ′i
is maximal-Li-consistent. ✷
Lemma A.2. If Γ, i :φ  MV k :⊥ and Γ, i :¬φ  MV k :⊥, then Γ  MV k :⊥.
Proof. The case i = k follows easily from the fact that each theory in MV is closed under
classical logic. Suppose i 
= k. From the hypothesis there exist two deductions Π1 and
Π2 of k :⊥ from Γ, i :φ and Γ, i :¬φ respectively. Therefore the following deduction is a
proof of k :⊥ from Γ .
Γ, [i :¬φ]
Π1
k :⊥
i :φ
⊥ki
Π2
k :⊥ ✷
We can now define the canonical models starting from maximal-k-consistent sets of
formulae Γ ′. From the proof of completeness for propositional logic we know that every
maximal-Li-consistent set of formulae Γ ′i univocally defines a propositional model m
Γ ′i
such that mΓ ′i cl φ if and only if φ ∈ Γ ′i .
Definition A.4 (Canonical model). Let Γ ′ be a maximal-k-consistent set of formulae.
The canonical model Cc is a compatibility relation containing a single compatibility pair
〈{mΓ ′1}, {mΓ ′2}〉.
Lemma A.3. For every Li -formula φ, mΓ ′i cl φ if and only if i :φ ∈ Γ ′i .
The proof is similar to that for propositional logic.
Lemma A.4. Cc is indeed a V-model.
Proof. To show that Cc is a V-model it has to be shown that it is a compatibility relation
over 2M1 ×2M2 , which satisfies both Definition 3.1 and Definition 4.1. It is clear, however,
from the definition of Cc, that Cc 
= ∅. All that needs to be proved in order to satisfy
Definition 3.1 is that 〈{mΓ ′1}, {mΓ ′2}〉 
= 〈∅,∅〉. This follows from item (iii) in Corollary A.1.
We show now that Cc satisfies Definition 4.1. We prove first that if mΓ ′1 
= ∅ then
mΓ
′
2 
= ∅. If mΓ ′1 
= ∅, then mΓ ′1 satisfies l or r (or both). Therefore 1 : l ∨ r ∈ Γ ′1 by
Lemma A.3. By Lemma A.1(i), 2 : l ∨ c∨ r ∈ Γ ′2 and mΓ
′
2 satisfies l ∨ c ∨ r again by
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Lemma A.3. Thus mΓ ′2 
= ∅. The proof that mΓ ′2 
= ∅ implies mΓ ′1 
= ∅ is similar. Finally,
both |c1| = 1 and |c2| = 1 are easy consequences of the definition of Cc. ✷
It is now straightforward to complete the proof of completeness.
Proof of Theorem A.2. Recall that the contrapositive is to be proved: if Γ MV k :φ then
there exists a model C with a sequence c such that for all j 
= k, cj  Γj , and there exists
a m ∈ ck such that m cl Γk but m cl φ.
Assuming that Γ MV k :φ holds, then Γ ∪ k :¬φ is k-consistent (if not then Γ ∪
k :¬φ  MV k :⊥ and so Γ  MV k :φ would also hold by an application of the ⊥k rule).
By Lemma A.1 there is a maximal-k-consistent set of formulae Γ ′ containing Γ ∪ k :¬φ.
Consider the model Cc defined starting from Γ ′. By Lemma A.3, ccj  Γ ′j , j 
= k.
Similarly the unique local modelmΓ ′k in cck satisfies Γ
′
k . From k :¬φ ∈ Γ ′k and Γ ′k maximal-
Lk-consistent, it follows that φ /∈ Γ ′k . Therefore mΓ
′
k  φ by Lemma A.3. This ends the
proof of the completeness theorem. ✷
Appendix B. Reasoning about belief—soundness and completeness
Let HMB ⊆ {Rdw,Rupr}. The goal of this section is to show that an HMB system
is sound and complete with respect to the class of HMB models (where MBK =
{Rdw,Rupr}). In Section B.1 we prove the Soundness theorem and in Section B.2 the
Completeness theorem.
In order to prove the Soundness and Completeness theorems, we slightly modify the
definition of HMB model (Definition 4.2), by introducing the following property.
Definition B.1 (Pointwise property). Let C = {c} with c= 〈c0, c1, . . .ck, . . .〉 be a model.
C satisfies the pointwise property if, for all compatibility sequences c ∈ C, for all i ∈ I ,
for any local model m ∈ ci , there exists a sequence c′ ∈C such that
(1) c′i = {m};
(2) c′j ⊆ cj , with j 
= i .
Intuitively: take a model C, a compatibility sequence c and a local model m belonging
to the ith element ci of c. C satisfies the pointwise property if it contains another sequence
c′ such that
(i) the ith element of c′ is exactly m, and
(ii) all the j th elements of c′ are subsets of the corresponding j th elements of c.
Fig. 15 graphically represents c and c′. Notice that we have a different c′ for any m ∈ c.
From now on, an HMB model is a model as introduced in Definition 4.2, which satisfies
also the pointwise property.
B.1. The proof of soundness
Theorem B.1 (Soundness theorem). If Γ  HMB k :φ, then Γ HMB k :φ.
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Fig. 15. The pointwise property.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the derivation of k :φ from Γ . The
proof for the base case, ⊃Ik , ⊃Ek , and ⊥k is equal to the one given in Section A.1. All that
needs to be proven is soundness of bridge rulesRdwk and Ruprk .
Rdwk−1: If Γ  HMB k :φ and the last rule used is Rdwk−1, then Γ HMB k − 1 :B(“φ”)
holds from the inductive hypothesis. Let C be an Rdw-model (MBK-model) and
c ∈ C be a sequence such that cj satisfies Γj , j 
= k. We must show that for every
m ∈ ck , m cl Γk implies m cl φ. Let m ∈ ck be a local model such that m cl Γk .
From the pointwise property of HMB models there exists a sequence c′ such that
(1) for j 
= k, c′j ⊆ cj ;
(2) for j = k, c′k = {m}.
It is easy to see that this chain satisfies all the formulae in Γ . Thus, from
the inductive hypothesis and from the fact that all the local models in c′k−1
satisfy Γk−1, it follows that all the local models in c′k−1 satisfy B(“φ”), i.e.,
B(“φ”) ∈Θ(c′k−1). From the definition ofRdw-model (MBK-model) φ ∈Θ(c′k).
Thus m cl φ and Γ HMB k :φ holds.
Ruprk: If Γ  HMB k :B(“φ”) and the last rule used isRuprk , then Γ HMB k+1 :φ from
the inductive hypothesis. Let C be a Rupr-model (MBK-model) and c ∈ C be a
sequence such that cj satisfies Γj , j 
= k. We must show that for every m ∈ ck ,
m cl Γk implies m cl B(“φ”). Let m ∈ ck be a local model such that m cl Γk .
From the pointwise property of HMB models there exists a chain c′ such that
(1) for every j 
= k, c′j ⊆ cj ;
(2) for j = k, c′k = {m};
c′ satisfies all the formulae in Γ . Thus, from the inductive hypothesis it
follows that all the local models in c′k+1 satisfy φ. Now, suppose that m does
not satisfy B(“φ”). From the definition of Rupr model (MBK-model) there
exists another sequence c′′ k-admissible for c′ such that c′′k+1 does not satisfy
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φ. Consider the model containing all the sequences in C and the sequence
〈c′0, c′1, . . . , c′k, c′′k+1, c′′k+2, . . .〉. It is easy to see that this model is still an Rupr-
model (MBK-model). From the fact that all the formulae in Γ have index  k it
follows that all the c′j in this sequence satisfy Γ and c′′k+1 does not satisfy k+1 :φ.
This contradicts the inductive hypothesis. Therefore there is no m which does not
satisfy B(“φ”) and Γ HMB k :B(“φ”) holds.
B.2. The proof of completeness
Theorem B.2 (Completeness theorem). If Γ HMB k :φ, then Γ  HMB k :φ.
The proof is similar to that in Section A.2 and relies upon the being able to construct
maximally consistent sets of formulae and being able to use them in the definition of the
canonical model.
The definitions of k-consistency, maximal-k-consistency, and maximal-Lk-consistency,
given in Appendix A, are used in the following.
Lemma B.1. Let Rdw ∈HMB. If Γ is k-consistent then Γ is j -consistent for all j  k.
Proof. Suppose that Γ  HMB j :⊥ holds for some j  k. Then Γ  HMB j :B(“⊥”)
holds from one assumption of j :¬B(“⊥”) and one application of the ⊥j rule. Therefore
Γ  HMB j + i :⊥. The same two steps can be repeated until Γ  HMB k :⊥. But this is
impossible because Γ is k-consistent. Thus Γ HMB j :⊥ for all j  k. ✷
The steps towards the definition of canonical model for an HMB system are similar to the
ones in Appendix A. It is easy to notice that the construction of the maximal-k-consistent
set of formulae in Lemma A.1 does not depend upon any particular MC system. Therefore
Lemma A.1 holds. What is different is the set of properties that the maximal-k-consistent
set Γ ′ satisfies.
Corollary B.1.
(i) LetRdw ∈HMB. If i :B(“φ”) ∈ Γ ′ then i + 1 :φ ∈ Γ ′.
(ii) LetRupr ∈ HMB. If i + 1 :φ ∈ Γ ′ and  HMB i + 1 :φ then i :B(“φ”) ∈ Γ ′.
(iii) Let HMB = MBK. For every i  k, Γ ′i is maximal-Li-consistent.
Proof.
(i) Suppose that i :B(“φ”) ∈ Γ ′ and i + 1 :φ /∈ Γ ′. Both i :B(“φ”) and i + 1 :φ
occur in some point of the enumeration i1 :φ1, i2 :φ2, . . . . Then there are two sets
Γ j1 ⊆ Γ ′ and Γ j2 ⊆ Γ ′ such that Γ j1 ∪i :B(“φ”) is k-consistent and Γ j2 ∪i+1 :φ
is not k-consistent. If j1 < j2 then i :B(“φ”) ∈ Γ j2 . We know that Γ j2 ∪ i + 1 :φ
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is not k-consistent, i.e., there exists a deduction Π of k :⊥ from Γ j2 ∪ i + 1 :φ.
Being i :B(“φ”) ∈ Γ j2 , the deduction
Γ j2
i + 1 :φ
i :B(“φ”)
Rdwi
Π
k :⊥
is a deduction of k:⊥ from Γ j2 . This is impossible because Γ j2 is k-consistent. In
a similar way we show that this holds even if j2 < j1. So, if i :B(“φ”) ∈ Γ ′ then
i + 1 :φ ∈ Γ ′.
(ii) Suppose that i + 1 :φ ∈ Γ ′, i + 1 :φ is provable (i.e.  HMB i + 1 :φ), and
i :B(“φ”) /∈ Γ ′. Both i+1 :φ and i :B(“φ”) occur in some point of the enumeration
i1 :φ1, i2 :φ2, . . . . Then there are two sets Γ j1 ⊆ Γ ′ and Γ j2 ⊆ Γ ′ such that
Γ j1 ∪ i + 1 :φ is k-consistent and Γ j2 ∪ i :B(“φ”) is not k-consistent. If j1 < j2
then i + 1 :φ ∈ Γ j2 . We know that Γ j2 ∪ i :B(“φ”) is not k-consistent, i.e., there
exists a deduction Π of k :⊥ from Γ j2 ∪ i :B(“φ”). Being i + 1 :φ ∈ Γ j2 and
i + 1 :φ provable, the following deduction
Γ j2
i + 1 :φ
i :B(“φ”)
Rupri
Π
k :⊥
is a deduction of k :⊥ from Γ j2 (the hypothesis that i + 1 :φ is provable is crucial
in order to satisfy the restriction of Rupri ). This is impossible because Γ j2 is
k-consistent. In a similar way we show that this holds even if j2 < j1. So if
i + 1 :φ ∈ Γ ′ then i :B(“φ”) ∈ Γ ′.
(iii) i-consistency of every Γ ′i with i  k follows from Lemma B.1. Suppose that
neither i :φ nor i :¬φ are in Γ ′i . Both i :φ and i :¬φ occur in some point of the
enumeration i1 :φ1, i2 :φ2, . . . . Then there are two sets of formulae Γ j1 ⊆ Γ ′ and
Γ j1 ⊆ Γ ′ such that Γ j1 ∪ i :φ  MBK k :⊥ and Γ j2 ∪ i :¬φ  MBK k :⊥. Suppose
that j1 < j2. Then Γ j2 ∪ i :φ  MBK k :⊥ as well. From Lemma B.2 it follows
that Γ j2  MBK k :⊥, but this contradict the k-consistency of Γ j2 . With a similar
proof it can be shown that j2 < j1 implies Γ j1  MBK k :⊥. But this contradict the
k-consistency of Γ j1 . So, for all Li -formulae either i :φ ∈ Γ ′i or i :¬φ ∈ Γ ′i . ✷
Lemma B.2. For all i  j , if Γ, i :φ  MBK j :ψ and Γ, i :¬φ  MBK j :ψ then Γ  MBK
j :ψ .
Proof. Being i  j , we can rewrite j as i + n with n  0. It will be shown that
Γ, i :φ  MBK i + n :ψ and Γ, i :¬φ  MBK i + n :ψ imply Γ  MBK i + n :ψ by induction
on n. Assuming n= 0, i.e., that both Γ, i :φ  MBK i :ψ and Γ, i :¬φ  MBK i :ψ hold, it is
easy to provide a derivation of Γ  MBK i :ψ . This can be done because each MBK system
is closed under propositional logic. The induction hypothesis is that Γ ′, i :φ  MBK i +
n :ψ ′ and Γ ′, i :¬φ  MBK i + n :ψ ′ imply Γ ′  MBK i + n :ψ ′ for arbitrary Γ ′, i + n :ψ ′.
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It will be shown that Γ, i :φ  MBK i + n + 1 :ψ and Γ, i :¬φ  MBK i + n + 1 :ψ
imply Γ  MBK i + n + 1 :ψ . On the assumption that Γ, i :φ  MBK i + n + 1 :ψ and
Γ, i :¬φ  MBK i + n + 1 :ψ hold, and from the finites of the derivation we know that
there exists a Γf ⊆ Γ for which Γf , i :φ  MBK i + n + 1 :ψ and Γf , i :¬φ  MBK
i + n + 1 :ψ . Γf contains formulae with index  i + n + 1 and can be rewritten as
{i + n + 1 :γ1, . . . , i + n + 1 :γm} ∪ Γ ′ where all the indexes in Γ ′ are  i + n. By m
applications of the ⊃Ii+n+1 rule followed by an application of theRupr rule, the following
derivations hold:
Γ ′, i :φ  MBK i + n :B(“γ1 ⊃ · · · (γm ⊃ψ) . . . ”)
Γ, i :¬φ  MBK i + n :B(“γ1 ⊃ · · · (γm ⊃ψ) . . .”).
The induction hypothesis is now applicable and so
Γ ′  MBK i + n :B(“γ1 ⊃ · · · (γm ⊃ψ) . . . ”)
holds. From this derivation, one application of Rdw followed by the assumption of
i + n+ 1 :γ1, . . . , i + n+ 1 :γm and m applications of ⊃Ei+n+1 gives {i + n+ 1 :γ1, . . . ,
i+n+1 :γm}∪Γ ′  MBK i+n+1 :ψ . Being {i+n+1 :γ1, . . . , i+n+1 :γm}∪Γ ′ equal
to Γf which is a subset of Γ , Γ  MBK i + n+ 1 :ψ holds. ✷
We are now able to define canonical models starting from maximal-k-consistent sets
of formulae Γ ′. From the proof of completeness for propositional logics we know that
every maximal-Li-consistent set of formulae Γ ′i univocally defines a propositional model
mΓ
′
i such that mΓ ′i cl φ if and only if φ ∈ Γ ′i . Let Γ ′ be a maximal-k-consistent set of
formulae. A compatibility sequence c is defined over Γ ′ if:
(i) ci = {mΓ ′i }, for Γ ′i maximal-i-consistent;
(ii) ci = {m ∈Mi |m cl Γ ′i }, otherwise.
Lemma B.3. For every Li -formula φ, and every compatibility sequence c defined over
Γ ′, ci HMB φ if and only if i :φ ∈ Γ ′.
Proof. If i :φ ∈ Γ ′ then all the local models in ci satisfy φ by construction. If ci satisfies
i :φ, then all the local models in ci satisfy φ. Being ci the class containing all and only the
models satisfying Γ ′i , then φ is a (propositional) logical consequence of the formulae in
Γ ′i . From the completeness theorem for propositional logic there exists a deduction of i :φ
from Γ ′i . Thus Γ ′ ∪ i :φ is k-consistent (if not, there is a trivial deduction of k :⊥ from Γ ′
which contradicts the k-consistency of Γ ′) and i :φ ∈ Γ ′. ✷
Definition B.2 (Canonical model). Let M0, M1, . . . , Mk , . . . be the classes of models
for the languages L0,L1, . . . ,Lk, . . . of an HMB system. The canonical model Cc is a
compatibility relation of type C ⊆ ∏i∈I 2Mi containing, for each maximal-k-consistent
set of formulae Γ ′ for some index k, the compatibility sequence c defined over Γ ′.
If HMB =Rdw, then Cc contains also a sequence c′ = 〈c0, . . . , ci−1, {m},∅, . . . ,∅, . . .〉
for each local model m ∈ ci .
Lemma B.4. Cc is indeed an HMB model.
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Proof. Let HMB = Rdw. Cc satisfies the pointwise property by definition. We have to
show that for every c ∈ Cc, B−1(“Θ(ci )”) ⊆ Θ(ci+1). The model contains compatibility
sequences of two different forms, the ones defined over maximal-k-consistent sets of
formulae and the ones added in order to satisfy the pointwise property. Consider the
first ones. Suppose that B(“φ”) ∈ Θ(ci ). By Lemma B.3, i :B(“φ”) ∈ Γ ′i , and by
Corollary B.1(i), i + 1 :φ ∈ Γ ′i+1. Again by Lemma B.3, i + 1 :φ ∈ Θ(ci+1). Consider
now the second form of compatibility sequences. Suppose that B(“φ”) ∈Θ(c′i ). Let j be
greatest index such that c′j 
= ∅. For every i  j the proof follows from the fact that c′i = ∅.
For every i < j − 1 the proof follows from the fact that every c′i is equal to ci . If i = j − 1,
then the proof is a consequence of the fact that c′j ⊆ cj and c′j−1 = cj−1.
Let HMB = Rupr. First, we show that Cc satisfies the pointwise property. It is easy
to observe that in a Rupr system any assumption in Lj (j 
= k) does not play any role
in inferring k :⊥. Therefore, each Γ ′ maximal-k-consistent is such that Γ ′j = Lj for each
j 
= k. On the other hand, it is easy to show that Γ ′k is maximal-Lk-consistent. This is due to
the fact that HMB systems are closed under propositional logic. Therefore, for each j 
= k,
cj = ∅, and ck = {mΓk }. As a consequence,Cc satisfies the pointwise property. Second, we
show that for every c ∈Cc B(“V ↓(ci )”)⊆Θ(ci ). Suppose that there is a formula i + 1 :φ
such that i :B(“φ”) is not in Θ(ci ). We show that i :B(“φ”) /∈ B(“V ↓(ci )”), i.e., there
exists a sequence c′ ∈ Cc such that c′i ⊆ ci and c′i+1  φ. We know that i + 1 :φ is not
provable in Rupr (otherwise i :B(“φ”) ∈ Θ(ci ) from Corollary B.1(ii) and Lemma B.3).
Thus there exists an i + 1-consistent set of formulae containing i + 1 :¬φ and, from
Lemma A.1, a maximal-i+1-consistent set of formulae Γ ′ containing i+1 :¬φ. Consider
the sequence c′ defined over Γ ′. From what we have said above the ith component of such
sequence is the empty set. Being ∅ ⊆ ci , c′ is i-admissible for c. From c′i+1 HMB φ it
follows that i + 1 :φ /∈ V ↓(ci ). So, i :B(“φ”) /∈ B(“V ↓(ci )”) and the proof is done.
Let HMB = MBK. First, we show that Cc satisfies the pointwise property. It is easy to
observe that in this case each Γ ′ maximal-k-consistent is such that Γ ′j = Lj for each j > k.
This fact, together with Corollary B.1(iii) implies that for each j > k, cj = ∅, and for each
j  k, cj = {mΓ ′i }. As a consequence Cc satisfies the pointwise property. The proof that
the model satisfies B−1(“Θ(ci )”) ⊆ Θ(ci+1) and B(“V ↓(ci )”) ⊆ Θ(ci ) is similar to the
ones for HMB=Rdw and HMB=Rupr, respectively. ✷
It is now straightforward to complete the proof of completeness.
Proof of Theorem B.2. Recall that the contrapositive is to be proved: if Γ HMB k :φ
then there exists a model C with a sequence c such that for all the j 
= k cj  Γj , and there
exists a m ∈ ck such that m cl Γi but m cl φ.
Assuming that Γ HMB k :φ holds, then Γ ∪ k :¬φ is k-consistent (if not then Γ ∪
k :¬φ  HMB k :⊥ and so Γ  HMB k :φ would also hold by an application of the ⊥k rule).
By Lemma A.1 there is a maximal-k-consistent set of formulae Γ ′ containing Γ ∪ k :¬φ.
Consider the modelCc defined in Definition B.2 and the sequence c defined over Γ ′. From
the definition of canonical model and Lemma B.3, for all i 
= k ci satisfies Γi . Moreover
ck = {mΓ ′k } and it satisfies all the formulae in Γ ′k ∪ k :¬φ. Being mΓ
′
k a classical model it
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does not satisfy φ. Thus c is the sequence falsifying Γ HMB k :φ. This ends the proof of
the completeness theorem. ✷
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